THE CHUKUA HATUA ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRAMME, TANZANIA

By Duncan Green

The Chukua Hatua (CH) programme of Oxfam GB (Oxfam) and its implementing partners is a five-year governance and accountability initiative in Tanzania (2010–15). The goal of CH is to achieve increased accountability and responsiveness of government to its citizens. The programme aims to achieve this by creating active citizenship; that is, citizens who know their rights and responsibilities, and are able and willing to demand them.
BACKGROUND

Relative to many countries, Tanzania has impressive formal local governance structures in place. However, the effectiveness of these structures is questionable. Village and district-level councils are elected and it is their role to oversee bottom-up planning and decision-making through to a full council at district level. However, effective control at both levels tends to be held by centrally appointed officials. Elected representatives at local level often lack the desire or capacity to hold these appointed officials to account.

At the local level, meetings are only called by the village chair and executive. These should take place quarterly, but often happen rarely, if at all. When they do take place, they are not well attended because local people have little faith in them. According to one young artist (and CH activist): ‘We ask questions in meetings but don’t get satisfactory or truthful answers, or we are prevented from asking because only a short time is set aside for questions and there are specific agenda to be discussed.’

There is also a sense of insecurity. People are afraid of being excluded from the patronage system and of losing its benefit or protection. There is evidence of direct threats to individuals who speak out. Party polarization is an issue, with any challenge by ordinary citizens often taken by leaders as an indication of opposition politics.

In addition, there is a lack of information about policies, laws, people’s rights, and even what is happening in the country. In rural areas, most people get their information from radio, but reception is sometimes poor and women in particular do not have time to listen. Print media are less popular because newspapers arrive very late (up to a week after publication) and in any case, many people cannot read. In addition, media suppression is a serious issue.

Women’s participation is severely restricted by their position in society. Patriarchal customs and attitudes mean that women have fewer opportunities to participate than men and, although they do attend meetings, they rarely speak. One woman noted: ‘Even if you say something good in front of five men, only one will listen to you.’

CH is a flexibly funded and well-studied programme (see Further Reading), which has received considerable support from staff at Oxfam headquarters. It has become well known for its approach to innovation, including its evolutionary theory of change, and the use of outcome mapping as a means both of evaluating impact, and ‘learning as you go’. This has made it possible to produce a detailed and rigorous case study, with a high degree of confidence about the contents.

BUDGET

As of December 2013, the total budget for Chukua Hatua stood at £2.05m.

MONITORING, EVALUATION, LEARNING

Monitoring and evaluation is a particular challenge in programmes like CH that are ‘learning by doing’. There is no clear set of indicators and activities that can be agreed in advance and built into the programme. CH has therefore been forced to use more innovative forms of
monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL), in particular ‘outcome mapping’. This has the advantage of allowing the programme to monitor emergent, unpredictable change, while also tying monitoring and evaluation very tightly to learning.

Behaviour change, both of citizens and duty bearers, is key to the CH project. Outcome mapping allows for a comprehensive method of tracking behaviour change as opposed to outputs. It also moves us beyond contribution to try to understand attribution in a complex environment.

Outcome mapping has provided a crucial feedback loop, enabling the project to track both positive and negative impacts, ensuring we minimize any potential harm as the project develops. It has also proved a source of intellectual coherence, ensuring that staff and partners are in regular and serious conversation about the programme’s design, purpose and achievements.

Specific monitoring and learning tools are utilized. These have included:

Regular use of outcome mapping and the biannual production of a comprehensive outcome mapping analysis report that considers the changes and key trends.

Study tours have been undertaken by the CH team along with other Oxfam team members from Tanzania and Oxford, and with partners.

The project brings together project stakeholders for a learning event on a biannual basis. These are an opportunity for the team to look at specific pieces of the programme in detail, and the outcome mapping reports and any other research or evaluations are timed to feed into them.

A series of learning briefs and case studies have been prepared by the CH team with the aim of documenting some of the experiences, challenges and learning that have been identified in Phase 2. The process of collecting the necessary information for the briefs was also a key opportunity for the team to unpack and understand the various factors, dynamics and actors that contributed to the visible changes.

A project Effectiveness Review was undertaken during Phase 2. The review used process tracing, a qualitative research approach, with elements of outcome harvesting, an approach to monitoring and evaluation inspired by outcome mapping that uses the following definition of outcome: a change in the behaviour, relationships, activities, or actions of the people, groups, and organizations with whom a programme works directly. CH as a whole has used outcome mapping from the outset, and found it useful both in terms of systematically recording impacts on ‘boundary partners’, and in building a common vision between project staff and partners.

According to the Effectiveness Review:

Of the three outcomes investigated, we found evidence that each had materialised, in two cases in full and in the case of the animator mobilisation of citizens, in part. The realisation of tangible outcomes in a relatively short period of time is commendable for an advocacy programme seeking to change entrenched citizen and leader behaviours.
THEORY OF CHANGE

Power analysis
CH’s internal ‘Theory of Change’ document sets out the power analysis underpinning its design. This includes:

**The four powers:** This model of change holds that disempowered, marginalized people must feel a sense of ‘power within’ – the light bulb moment when people realize they have rights, and that those they elect should serve them, rather than vice versa. This allows them to build ‘power with’ – the coming together of various forms of association around common issues – to achieve ‘power to’ – asserting their rights, campaigning, mobilizing. This exercise in active citizenship allows poor people to exercise ‘power over’ officials, large corporations or other power holders. By promoting power within, with, and to, CH seeks to enable people, particularly previously marginalized women, to raise their particular issues with those in authority, in whichever way they choose. Empowerment is thus part of creating an ‘enabling environment’ for pro-poor change.

Seen another way, one of the main targets of CH has been to overcome a prevalent sense of powerlessness and futility, in which citizens see no point in protesting or taking action, because it will have no impact. Minor victories, especially early on, can build momentum and a sense of possibility, leading to more ambitious efforts down the road.

Change hypotheses
The assumptions about social change underpinning the CH programme include:

**Long-term shifts:** lasting changes can take place in deep underlying norms, values and beliefs regarding people’s expectations of duty bearers and their beliefs about what they can legitimately speak out about. These shifts involve ‘a new relationship between representatives and the represented, based on shared understanding and mutual accountability.’ They also reflect Oxfam’s focus on gendered power relations.

**Purposive individual/collective action:** CH believes that active citizenship can bring about increased responsiveness by duty bearers, and that collective action is a more effective and less risky approach to achieving this.

**Transitions to accountability:** this is based on the work of Jonathan Fox in Mexico. Fox found that local breakthroughs in accountability arise through the interaction of ‘the thickening of civil society’ and successful reforms by parts of the state, e.g. particular ministries or local officials. These often involve cycles of conflict and resolution, which we are beginning to see in Tanzania. This is particularly the case in Loliondo, where CH has adopted a more opportunistic approach of reacting to protests and conflicts, supporting citizens’ movements with some impressive results.

**Drivers of change and importance of alliances:** one of the findings of ‘drivers of change’ work by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) was that successful change often comes about through alliances of dissimilar actors, e.g. social movements, churches, sympathetic officials and private sector champions. CH has tried, with mixed
success, to move beyond the usual circle of non-government organizations (NGOs) and community organizations, for example in trying to involve faith leaders and state officials.

**Oxfam’s change strategy**

Oxfam’s change strategy was based on two assumptions, set out in the CH Theory of Change document:⁷

- If we build citizens’ awareness and capacity, assist them to overcome their fear, and if the action is in the interest of and not of the detriment to their livelihoods, then they will act.
- Increased pressure from citizens for better delivery of public services will lead to local institutions being increasingly compelled to respond.

Of these, the first has proved more robust than the second. The first phase of CH identified the animator model as the most successful variant of the evolutionary approach, and this was scaled up in Phase 2. At the time of writing, some 400 animators have been trained before returning to their communities, where many have acquired influential leadership roles, coming up with innovative new approaches to accountability and governance. The loss of control for CH involved in this process is both welcome and a challenge – for example, if animators get into trouble with the authorities and CH is required to come to their aid.

Animators in particular have played a catalytic role in increasing the level of active citizenship in many communities. Interestingly, the animation approach seems to have been well suited to increasing women’s agency, as women have become some of the most effective animators, and women often outnumber men in village meetings.

The project has been partner-based, but this has not been easy. Partners were either created by helping promising individuals set up NGOs, or were identified from a very limited pool. In almost all cases, we had to go with the most suitable partner organisations that were available, and then our team worked very closely with them to broaden their thinking and analysis, through mentoring, joint field visits and learning events. In Phase 1, we mainly used local consultants, since we had a limited time to deliver a lot of different activities. Also, we could only offer contracts of six to nine months, which does not work well as a way of supporting local NGOs, as they need more stability than that to avoid becoming suppliers, rather than following their own strategic plans. Perhaps because of CH’s commitment to active citizenship, the more activist-based partners took to the model more easily than those with a more traditional governance background. Informal allies who were working at national level on specific issues such as land rights wanted real evidence from people in communities; CH was able to provide that bridge.

The learning around the second point has played an important part in the evolution of the project’s theory of change. In practice, duty bearers have reacted to heightened citizen pressure in very different ways. While some have opted for confrontation and threatened animators and activists, others have expressed a willingness to work together, but have also expressed doubts over their ability to fulfil their roles as duty bearers.

The project has thus mirrored some of the broader conceptual shifts on accountability work,⁹ moving from a ‘demand’ side approach (train the animators) to both a ‘supply’ side (train the councillors) and more significantly, a focus on building the social contract between citizens...
and states. This often uses a ‘convening and brokering’ approach, which aims to create spaces of trust and dialogue where villagers, elected representatives, officials and others can work together and build trust, on the way to finding improved governance solutions. Animators themselves took the lead in this, creating ‘village dialogues’ that in some cases have rather eclipsed the procedurally hidebound formal village meetings.

**WHAT HAPPENED?**

In 2010 Oxfam approached Accountability Tanzania (AcT), an innovative DFID-funded programme managed by KPMG, to discuss a potential partnership. AcT made clear that its eligibility criteria included: a) reaching at least 1 million people; and b) leading to a steep change in impact. It was also interested in supporting innovative approaches, including outcome mapping, as a way to address the issue of measuring change in accountability work (see below).

Oxfam submitted a one-page ‘big ideas’ concept note. Following acceptance of this, negotiations took place on the project plan and on how it would measure change. Oxfam then signed the contract.

CH was faced with finding a suitable methodology for promoting accountability in a complex political system in which ‘what works’ was far from clear. It developed an innovative methodology, running multiple simultaneous pilot projects to test different approaches, followed by a review after nine months, on the basis of which the most successful pilots were scaled up. This has been likened to the evolutionary mechanism (variation → selection → amplification), or even venture capitalism (fund 10 start-ups knowing that only one will succeed).

To this end, CH was divided into three phases.

**Phase 1 (August 2010 to December 2011)**

This phase tested five approaches to building active citizenship.

**Election promises tracking:** Talk, and promises, are cheap in Tanzanian elections. This stream aimed to use elections as ‘windows of opportunity’, by helping citizens hold candidates to account before and after their election. During the run-up to the national elections in October 2010, CH introduced the concept of tracking/monitoring among community members in Shinyanga region and the Ngorongoro and Loliondo divisions. Training included basic civics education and recording skills. Twenty-eight trackers from five districts then attended election rallies and recorded candidates’ promises, before feeding them back to their communities.

**Farmer animators:** The animator work with farmers sought to increase their participation in economic and political decision-making at local level. Animators, nominated by their farmers’ groups, received a series of training sessions enabling them to stimulate debate, discussion and actions within their farmer groups on issues related to governance and the provision of quality services. There was a gap of one to two months between sessions, which enabled farmers to put what they learned into action. It also helped CH to monitor what was or was not working for the farmers, and to adapt the process accordingly. Training sessions and
other activities sought to connect the farmer animators within and across districts to enable them to work together on common issues, sharing ideas and lessons learned, and building up the numbers needed to take collective action.

**Active musicians:** The work with active musicians was intended to empower musicians to become knowledgeable and more active in shifting citizens’ belief in the value of monitoring public services and demanding their rights and entitlements. The project built musicians’ capacity on governance issues with the hope that they would start to write songs and plays that create awareness and influence people to take action.

**Pupils' leadership project:** The pupils’ leadership project in Shinyanga aimed to:

Enable students to elect, monitor and hold their student leaders accountable;

Build up student leadership that is responsive and understands its roles and responsibilities vis-a-vis the student body, teachers and school management;

Empower students to transfer the skills they learn through this process in school to their families and communities, and use the project as a means to engage community members on school monitoring and management. CH aimed to use existing spaces that were supposed to provide a voice for students but were instead being used by teachers to control them. These consisted of school *barazas* (meetings, made up of teachers, parents, students) and student *barazas* (made up of students and mentor teachers). Both of these spaces are part of the official structure, but before the intervention, they were not democratic or serving the students. CH sought to help students to campaign for leadership and to hold elections; linking students with community ‘champions’ to help them raise issues with teachers and school management committees.

**Community radio:** In 2010, when CH began, there was no access to Tanzanian radio within the Ngorongoro and Loliondo divisions. The only radio access was to one Kenyan station. There was also limited mobile phone reception and little newspaper or TV culture, therefore the main source of knowledge and information was through storytelling between citizens, as they moved with their cattle on foot. The community radio pilot aimed to promote active citizenship among the pastoral communities by helping them voice demands for their rights and services.

Towards the end of Phase 1, a seminar was held with partners, consultants and communities to agree on which experiments were proving most successful, and to discuss plans to scale them up in the second phase.

The key questions were:

1. What works in catalyzing citizens to act?
2. What makes the government respond positively or negatively to a demand?

The following conclusions were drawn from a combination of information sources and discussions during August 2010 and September 2011, including learning tours, outcome mapping, independent research, learning events with partners and communities, and team meetings.
1. What works in catalyzing citizens to act?

In some cases, awareness-raising is sufficient to trigger action. For example, the active musicians’ pilot raised the awareness of large numbers of people who then took action, including demonstrating about electricity plants being moved to another district, demanding budget explanations from the district council, and students demanding a voice in the way their secondary school was run. The election tracking was successful in getting citizens to continue to engage with governance after the elections.

The farmer animators managed to get farmers’ groups and other groups such as school committees or faith groups, to take action. Similarly, in the student councils’ pilot, students raised issues with teachers and achieved some small improvements on teacher absenteeism and lack of desks. This also provided young people with a profound early experience of democracy.

Across the pilots, from farmers’ to musicians’ groups, collective voice has been a mechanism for overcoming fear.

2. What makes the government respond positively or negatively to a demand?

On the question of government response, results were seen that could be attributed to good tactics, perseverance by citizens, leaders being sufficiently pressurized to act, or action by a willing local leader. More likely it was a combination of all these factors.

However, when citizens have the will but not the capacity to make demands in an appropriate way, thinking through the tactics and consequences, the response by those in power is more likely to be negative. For example, following the active musicians’ work, people acted en masse, only for leaders in positions of power to quash their demands through intimidation and threats.

The election trackers had been trained to record, track and follow up on promises, but when leaders chose not to respond, the trackers and wider community did not know what to do next. Likewise the student leaders were trained to raise issues, but not how to find ways to ensure they were listened to. Some teachers listened and acted, but others considered the newfound voice of students as a threat to their authority.

In comparison, in the farmer animators’ pilot, where ongoing skills training and coaching was given on how to strategize in taking action, community groups were able to agree their most pressing issues together, and decide on the best course of action. Although not always successful in getting a response, they had a higher success rate, with more than 30 known accountability success stories.
WHAT DID NOT WORK – AND WHY?

Phase 1 (August 2010 to December 2011)
There were a number of components of Phase 1 that were challenging.

The active musicians were not able to work well in the pastoralist context of the Ngorongoro and Loliondo divisions, because the communities were widely dispersed and it was hard to get to them.

The community radio idea did not work because the government did not issue a licence.

The election promises tracking worked better in the Ngorongoro and Loliondo divisions than Shinyanga, because it was begun further in advance of the elections. This gave more time for sensitization of both communities and politicians. In future, an even earlier start would enable communities to push political parties to respond to their own priorities, instead of simply choosing from what was offered to them.

The farmer animators’ work was less successful in spreading awareness beyond the groups that the animators belonged to. This might have been due to their lack of a ‘formal’ position in community leadership; other ways need to be found to promote widespread awareness in communities alongside the animators’ approach.

Students were able to make demands within their school environment, but the assumption that they would be able to take this approach into the community did not hold – there was simply not enough respect for young people’s viewpoints.

It was agreed that the work with community animators had the greatest potential and had already produced real results on the ground. Scaling up this area of the work formed the backbone of Phase 2. Student work moved across to a separate Oxfam programme.

Parallel to this process of ‘managed evolution’ in areas such as Shinyanga, a more opportunistic theory of change in Maasai communities in Ngorongoro and Loliondo involved supporting (with national and international advocacy, funds and legal support) community struggles on access to land. Activists were also supported by the project in some conflicts in Shinyanga involving gold mining compensation.

Phase 2 (January 2012 to September 2013)
The core of Phase 2 was to build on the most successful Phase 1 ‘variant’ – animation; and to focus on duty bearers (supply side) as well as citizens (demand side), by training councillors and village chairpersons to help them meet their responsibilities. By the end of Phase 2, in October 2013, CH had trained 400 animators, along with 160 village councillors and 200 village chairpersons.

An internal review of Phase 2 in October 2013 summarized the outcomes as follows:

Outcome 1: Citizens become responsible and hold government to account

CH has shown the strongest progress on this outcome in Phase 2. As a result, the programme has seen individual citizens and whole communities rise up to demand their
rights and entitlements, to convene spaces and set their agenda in front of their leaders, to monitor and ensure responsibility for transparent and accountable utilization of resources, and to go even as far as ousting leaders who do not assume such responsibility. In Shinyanga, citizen action is still largely confined to the local government arena but we are also seeing a building of confidence that has allowed citizens to engage with national processes such as the constitution review.

In Ngorongoro and Loliondo, Oxfam was able to build on the strength of relationships and credibility built over a decade through its pastoralism programme. Working through partners, civil society organizations and community actions, the programme helped local communities address threats of eviction, conflicts between Maasai and Batemi (Sonjo) and the proposed land use plan. CH added flavour, confidence and connectivity, creating a bridge between community and government with space to share governance issues.

In the Ngorongoro and Loliondo divisions, the whole district has been able to coalesce around a single issue and hold even national government and the international community to account (on land rights and community forestry).

**Outcome 2:** Local leaders effectively lobby government on community demands

As our work with citizens and communities on the one hand, and local leaders on the other hand, has solidified, the programme has seen an increase in numbers of local leaders who are more responsive to citizens and who use their particular role in the local government structure to lobby government on community demands. The actions taken to lobby government have been both explicit, such as MPs raising issues in parliament or councillors in district council meetings, and more subtle, such as evidence-gathering of mismanagement of funds and support to citizen activism.

**Outcome 3:** Government institutions are receptive to the demands of citizens

The land rights campaign and the community forestry campaign in the Ngorongoro and Loliondo divisions both won positive responses from government institutions, despite significant challenges and obstacles. Similarly, an increasing number of village governments in Shinyanga, Ngorongoro and Loliondo are responding to the demands of citizens. Even where they have not yet reached the stage of responsive institutions, at least dialogue and engagement are now occurring. Increasing progress is also being seen in eliciting similar responses beyond the village-level, with ward and district government institutions also demonstrating more support to citizens, particularly when the media is used to add pressure.

**Animation**

In Phase 1 and at the beginning of Phase 2, animators in Shinyanga were working around a variety of issues and in a relatively *ad hoc* manner. We saw animators and their groups working, sometimes simultaneously, on access to water, health and education services, on land and natural resources, on village income and resources, corruption and mismanagement. The plethora of issues being raised and tackled contributed to a vibrant programme learning and development opportunity in Shinyanga and allowed animators to own the process and decide on their needs and priorities.
Over the last year, there has been natural growth on this front as animators have expanded their work to influence whole communities, and communities in turn have shaped the agenda collectively. This has led increasingly to communities picking up on similar issues, often those issues that cut across various groups. The key issues that are repeatedly being tackled by ‘animator communities’ in Shinyanga, Ngorongoro and Loliondo are: village governance and transparency, particularly on village meetings and income and expenditure reports; mining and its impact on land, income and community livelihood; and natural resource ownership.

An innovation around the animation model in Phase 2 has been on expanding the approach to other groups, including teachers, faith leaders, and youth (both in-school and out-of-school). Teachers were a group who were brought on board early on in Phase 2. In many communities, they are working closely with farmer animators to support their actions and in a smaller number of communities, they are spearheading issues themselves.

Phase 2 has seen CH begin to grapple more intensively with issues of risk. From the sensitive land rights situation in Loliondo, to the arrest and court case of one of the animators, to the questioning of our partners by District Commissioners in Maswa and Itilima, CH has been forced to refine its approach to risk management. Some of the key lessons on risk that the programme will be taking into Phase 3 include: the importance of working with whole communities and large numbers in order to protect individual animators and activists; understanding and sharing knowledge on the laws that govern the spaces and actions that we are working on; and the realization that you cannot remove risk altogether – therefore there is the need to allow partners and citizens to make an informed decision about the actions they are taking, bearing in mind the risk they will be incurring.

CH has been quick to pick up on ‘big issues’ that make a splash. Equally important however, as we have learnt, are the ‘smaller’ actions being taken every day by the people who we work with; actions such as speaking to orphans about their rights and their needs, calling for village meetings and attending the meetings, and speaking to neighbours about democracy and human rights. All these are actions that are contributing to the CH movement, creating communities of solidarity, and building a groundswell of citizens who are informed, aware and active.

Phase 2 has also highlighted an obvious fact – change happens differently in different areas. We have seen this clearly in CH between Ngorongoro, Loliondo and Shinyanga. Whereas in Ngorongoro and Loliondo a long history of land rights violations grew into activism to shape community perceptions of their rights and entitlements, our programme in Shinyanga cultivated a very broad-based approach to rights and entitlements which is now developing into activism around specific issues. The differences have been shaped by the different laws and regulations that affect the two areas, and by the demographic, cultural and socio-economic changes and factors that characterize the contexts. Such differences can even be seen between villages, wards and districts in Shinyanga, whereby each community has taken on CH at a different pace, in a different manner, and over different issues. This learning demonstrates the validity of our theory of change proposition on: a) the non-linearity and evolutionary nature of change; and b) the dynamics of tipping points and breakthroughs, both of which require a programme that remains flexible, responsive and opportunistic.
CRITICAL JUNCTURES, EVENTS AND SURPRISES

The rhythm of CH has varied considerably with geography. A steady expansion in its animation work in Shinyanga, punctuated with the small events, conflicts and crises that characterize any social change process, contrasts with much larger conflicts in Loliondo, particularly over land.

The programme has also suffered its fair share of internal ‘critical junctures’ around staff turnover and tensions (subsequently largely resolved) with funders.

What changed along the way?

One surprise, which has placed considerable demands on the project, is the frequency of negative reactions to which it has had to respond. This includes supporting partners and activists who end up in positions of conflict or risk, including imprisonment, reputational slander, intimidation, and others. In response the programme has introduced scenario planning with partners and communities, and risk mitigation measures such as working with animators to ensure that they understand the national laws affecting active citizenship including negotiation skills and conflict resolution in all animation training.

Another change in strategy that emerged during the course of the programme was an increasing understanding of the complex and multi-faceted nature of social/associational capital in villages, and its implications for building citizen action. In particular, Phase 2 identified faith leaders as an important source both of trust and, potentially, multipliers of its efforts to build citizen agency.

However, a review in late 2013 suggested that the attempt to develop new constituencies was only partially successful. This was not least because the programme had tended to try to replicate its ‘farmer animator’ training package with groups such as faith leaders, rather than step back and consider what kind of animation course would be most suitable for the views and needs of faith leaders, perhaps involving partners more steeped in the traditions of different faith groups.

Linked to that, CH’s choice of partners, trainers and methods may have focused too exclusively on ‘hard’ or high-risk conflictive activism (although of course, the communities and activists themselves had the final say in deciding what tactics and issues to address). There is an argument for doing more on less conflictual forms of agency, such as collective public works, or raising money for good causes, such as orphanages. These can provide more quick wins and build agency and momentum in the longer term. Many of the most successful experiences started ‘small and soft’ and built up in this way.
WIDER LESSONS

As the programme has matured, the initial high level of innovation has become hard to sustain. The programme has acquired commitments both in terms of partners and the needs of animators and others, and an increasing amount of effort and programme resources is required to maintain and develop those relationships, leaving less room for experimentation. The elements that have been developed cannot become sustainable in the short amount of time available; slowly the project staff are beginning to transfer control of the project and citizens are taking action without the knowledge or input of Oxfam or partner organizations. This seems to be the beginnings of a spontaneous movement of people and of a move towards sustainability.

A further lesson is the power of flexible and supportive donorship. CH’s enthusiasm for innovation derives in no small part from AcT’s encouragement and permission. AcT challenged Oxfam to go beyond ‘business as usual’, pushing it to try new approaches, and supporting it when it did so.

FURTHER READING


AUDIO VISUAL

ANNEX: TIMELINE

March 2010 Origins of project: one page concept note written; project coordinator appointed and takes over project development.

August 2010 – December 2011 (Phase I)

September 2010 – February 2011 Difficult few months. KPMG want to see progress on the ground, but so far not much to show them.

September 2010 OGB International Director worried on reputational risk, asks HQ staff (governance advisers) to accompany programme.

December 2010 First training workshop held in Shinyanga for staff and prospective partners and consultants to discuss how to do outcome mapping (OM), identify boundary partners (9 identified, draft outcome statement agreed for each one). District Commissioner of Shinyanga opens. The AcT programme director plays key role.

March 2011 First learning event, Mwanza.

May 2011 Discussion with KPMG (managing DFID funds) on Theory of Change – evolutionary model is articulated for first time.

September 2011 Selection workshop to discuss/select from five original projects.

January 2012 – September 2013 (Phase 2)

February 2012 Court case involving animator, Olosokwan village.16

June 2012 Land returned to Oolosokwani village. Half had been taken by a tourist company. Government tried to impose compulsory purchase of village land. Communities mobilized to defend land, and CH supported court case.

March 2013 Gold mine compensation case in Shinyanga.17
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 2012</td>
<td>JNew DFID Country Director and KPMG visit CH in Loliondo. Leads to increased donor trust and confidence in CH.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Ten successes of CH widely circulated within DFID and KPMG, greatly improving profile of project. Influential local actors become increasingly positive about the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2013</td>
<td>Learning tour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2013</td>
<td>Government agrees (verbally) to abandon attempts to take 1500 sq km of land in Ngorongoro on 'wildlife corridor'.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2013</td>
<td>Community Forest titles handed over in Enguserosambu after court case supported by CH.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2015</td>
<td>End of programme.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTES


5 Outcome 1: Councillors becoming responsive and aware; Outcome 2: Animators mobilizing citizens; Outcome 3: District commissioner support for community forest ownership.


10 See Annex for a more detailed timeline.


16 The animator mobilized the community to demand village income and expenditure reports, and to question why the village committee was only supporting boys to attend secondary school. Village leaders reported her to the police for ‘incitement/disturbing the peace’. When she reported to the
police station, a large part of the community accompanied her to prevent her arrest. The police released her. Leaders publicly apologised.


